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Summary We analyze the endogenous appearance of money substitutes, their
interaction with outside money, and resulting distortions in the price system of an
economy with large monopolies and wide-spread informal networks. The economy
consists of productive, individually optimizing agents and less productive colluding
agents who issue universally acceptable money substitutes. We distinguish equi-
libria by types of exchange both between agents of one type and between those
of diﬀerent types and show that for small trading frictions, only three types of
equilibria can be sustained. A novelty of the analysis is that the agents issuing
money substitutes survive by their collusion.
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1 Introduction
The endogenous appearance of money substitutes is one of the important questions
of monetary economics. There are several search-theoretic models incorporating
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inside money. The word money indicates the object which is used as a tangible
medium of exchange among the agents who recognize it as an asset, and the label
inside shows that this object is supplied by the private sector. In Cavalcanti et al.
[6], Cavalcanti and Wallace [7], [8], and Williamson [16] inside money is given a
role both as credit and as a tangible medium of exchange. In Cavalcanti et al. [6]
and Cavalcanti and Wallace [7], [8], it is assumed that a fraction of the population -
a banking sector - has access to a private note-issuing technology, while the rest of
the economy - a non-banking sector - uses inside money as a medium of exchange.
In Williamson [16] a model with claims on banks as private money is explored.
Agents can choose between investing into low or high-return projects, so there may
exist welfare dominated equilibria where banks hold low-return assets. Burdett et
al. [5] introduce endogenous money as a commodity that can be either consumed
or stored and used as a medium of exchange. In this model, there is no role for
credit because the trade, if it takes place, is always quid pro quo.
In addition to the media of exchange produced in the private sector, all the
above models with inside and endogenous money incorporate the exogenous provi-
sion by a public sector of ﬁat currency usually referred to as outside or exogenous
money. In Burdett et al. [5] and Cavalcanti and Wallace [7], [8], it is shown that an
equilibrium can be achieved in an economy with only endogenous or inside money
(respectively) in circulation. The former paper also shows that if the supply of ex-
ogenous money is suﬃciently small, both types of money may coexist. Cavalcanti
and Wallace [7], [8] consider only implementable allocations that arise with inside
and outside money separately; they do not examine coexistence of both kinds of
money. In Cavalcanti et al. [6], coexistence of private and government money is
studied only for the case of a discount factor close to one, but no analytical results
for endogenous variables are obtained.
The model presented here combines key features of Burdett et al., [5], Caval-
canti et al. [6], and Cavalcanti and Wallace [7], [8]. To be more speciﬁc, we consider
the case when inside and outside moneys coexist. However, we visualize the note-
issuing sector not as a banking sector, but as a coalition of large producers, such
as gas, oil, or electricity companies. We rule out the possibility of bankruptcy. A
novelty of the analysis is that the agents issuing money substitutes survive by their
collusion.
A motivation for our study is the transition Russian economy. There is em-
pirical evidence suggesting that this economy diﬀers signiﬁcantly from both the
command economy with no real monetary transactions, and the market economy,
where most of transactions are made with money. Before August 1998, the Russian
economy was characterized by wide spread use of barter and money substitutes
(up to 60-80 per cent for some industries, see, e.g., Aukutsionek [1]), and many
serious distortions were attributed to this fact. Apparently we were confronted
with a new type of economy – a partially monetized quasi-market economy1 –
and therefore appropriate macroeconomic models are needed. Our model shows
that key features of the Russian economy can be derived from the co-existence of
colluding agents with relatively low productivity and more productive individually
1 This hybrid economy has been called the virtual economy (see, for example, Gaddy
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optimizing agents. In particular, the model explains naturally wide spread use of
barter and money substitutes.2
In order to explain the endogenous appearance and circulation of money sub-
stitutes in the economy, we take the monetary search approach. Agents are placed
in a standard environment (see Kiyotaki and Wright [14]), in which diﬀerent peo-
ple have diﬀerent preferences over a large number of diﬀerentiated goods. The
economy consists of two types of agents with inherited diﬀerences in productivity.
Through informal connections, less productive agents can collude (in a sense ex-
plained later) in order to maximize their welfare. The collusion makes it possible
for these agents to issue universally accepted means of exchange, which we call
notes. More productive agents have no means to establish informal connections
and so they act as individually optimizing agents. The motivation for this set-
ting is a description of the Russian economy as consisting of new or restructured
and privatized ﬁrms and old, mainly unrestructured enterprises, which manage to
survive due to collusion, informal networks and widespread use of IOU’s. Notice
that despite some positive changes in Russia attributed to the real depreciation
of the ruble and high oil prices, the share of loss making enterprises continues to
be remarkably large, nearly 40 per cent (see Gaddy and Ickes [13]). It is true that
barter went down in recent years, but the problem of the virtual economy as “..the
outcome of agents’ adapting their behavior to an environment that threatens their
survival...” (see Gaddy and Ickes [13]) remains to be acute for today’s Russia.
We classify possible types of equilibria for the case of small trading frictions.
We prove that there are three classes of equilibria:
– equilibria without exchange between diﬀerent types of agents and all the money
circulating among the more productive agents;
– equilibria where all the money circulates among more productive agents, less
productive agents do not use money but notes circulate both between types
and among the more productive type;
– equilibria, when both money and notes circulate between types.
In any equilibrium, no means of exchange are used by the colluding sector so
that all goods are produced for credit; this reﬂects the existence of barter chains
in the Russian economy. We show that for a suﬃciently small level of trading
frictions, only the ﬁrst two of the above classes of equilibria are possible. Moreover,
if the diﬀerence in productivity across the types of agents is suﬃciently large
and trading frictions are small, then only equilibria without interaction between
types are possible. We will not consider the latter equilibria in this paper. Pure
monetary equilibria were examined in Boyarchenko [3] for general utility functions
and several types of heterogeneity of agents. Possible pure monetary equilibria in
our case are equilibria when there is no trade between types and the economy splits
into two disjoint economies. The eﬀect of splitting is demonstrated in Boyarchenko
[3]; since in that model there is neither inside money nor collusion, there exists a
2 Notice that there are models of the Russian economy that analyze its distortions
from diﬀerent viewpoints – see, e.g., Blanchard and Kremer [2], Ericson [9], Ericson and
Ickes [10], and Woodruﬀ [17] and the bibliography there. None of these papers uses the
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cut-oﬀ type such that all types with marginal productivity lower than the cut-oﬀ
do not produce or trade for money.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We specify the model and deﬁne
equilibrium in Section 2. In Section 3, we characterize equilibria without monetary
exchange between types of agents. We show that existence of this class of equilibria
depends on the diﬀerence in the marginal productivity of agents, trading frictions
and the supply of money: when a certain combination of these parameters crosses
a certain threshold, this kind of equilibria vanishes. In Section 4, we provide a
characterization of equilibria with all kinds of trades between agents and show
that these are less viable than the equilibria without monetary exchange between
types in the sense that the former disappear at a lower threshold. Section 5 contains
our main conclusions. We dot not present proofs of theorems or other technicalities
in the paper. An interested reader can ﬁnd those in Boyarchenko and Levendorskiˇ i
[4].
2 Model Speciﬁcation
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived agents. The size of population is normalized
to one. Agents produce and consume non-storable goods (or services) at discrete
points in continuous time. Agents and goods are indexed by points on a circle of
circumference two. The agents have idiosyncratic tastes for goods in the sense that
at any time, an agent indexed by point i has a demand for a particular variety of
goods which lies within the distance X 2 (0;1=2) from point i.3 When an agent
consumes an amount q of a demanded good, she enjoys utility u(q). We assume
that u satisﬁes standard properties: u is smooth, increasing, concave and satisﬁes
the Inada conditions. Agent i derives no utility from any amount of good lying
distance x > X from i.
Each agent i can instantaneously produce good j at a ﬁxed distance Z, 2X <
Z < 2 ¡ 2X, clockwise from i. We assume ﬁxed production cost k per unit of
good (k may diﬀer among agents). Due to these properties of preferences and the
production technology, agents never produce for themselves. They must trade in
the exchange sector in order to consume. Trading partners arrive according to a
Poisson process with the constant arrival rate ®. It is clear that the speciﬁcation of
preferences and production opportunities rules out a double coincidence of wants.
Thus there can be no direct barter, and the probability of a single coincidence of
wants is X.
There is an exogenous money supply M 2 (0;1). Money is indivisible and
perfectly storable. Each agent can carry either one unit of money or none. Indivis-
ibility of money and a unit bound on individual money holdings are strong, but
popular assumptions in monetary search models (see, for example, Burdett et al.
[5], Cavalcanti et al. [6], Cavalcanti and Wallace [7], [8], and Wallace and Zhou
[15]). These assumptions simplify the models, and still allow one to endogenize
prices as reciprocals to quantities of good produced for a unit of money. In some
situations, such as in Wallace and Zhou [15], indivisibility is used as descriptive of
situations the authors want to model. In our model, indivisibility of money and
3 By a distance we mean the shortest arc between i and a given good.Inside and Outside money 5
money substitutes (see below) is assumed for tractability in the ﬁrst place. On the
other hands, since we view the agents, not as individuals but as managers of enter-
prizes, where all transactions are performed in large currency denominations, and
money substitutes are issued in Russia only in large denominations, indivisibility
of money is a reasonable assumption.
Agents may issue indivisible and perfectly storable promissory notes (IOU’s).
Notes are distinguishable in the sense that no counterfeiting is possible. A fraction
of agents – we call them colluding agents (and the rest the population private
agents) – collude in the following sense:
(i) they agree on a rule for note-issuing (to be speciﬁed below) and a quantity qn
of good to be redeemed for a note issued by any colluding agent;
(ii) they agree to use no means of exchange when they trade with each other and
to produce a ﬁxed amount qc of good if such trade occurs;
(iii) each colluding agent signs a note she issues and writes a date of issue on it;
(iv) all information about a trading history of every colluding agent is recorded and
spread among all such agents;
(v) if at some point in time, a colluding agent deviates from any of the agreed
rules, other colluding agents make it publicly known that notes issued by the
deviator after this moment are not going to be redeemed;
(vi) the rule for note-issuing and quantities qn and qc are chosen so as to maximize
the welfare of colluding agents subject to incentive compatibility constraints.
Some readers may ﬁnd it strange that agents collude only either on the trade credit
among themselves or trades made with inside money, and do not collude on the
price in terms of outside money. Disregarding price setting behavior in terms of
outside money makes the model more tractable, and at the same time allows us
to emphasize the role of inside money as a device for the transfer of value from
more productive to less productive agents.
The note-issuing rule deserves special consideration. On an individual level,
a colluding agent would not issue a note unless she enjoys positive utility from
consumption of a given good, i.e., an individual agent issues a note with probability
X. However, the supply of notes aﬀects all endogenous variables in the economy
including the welfare of colluding agents. Thus, it may be optimal to issue a note
with probability xc > X in order to increase the amount of liquidity in the economy
and make the outside money less valuable. If this is the case, the “social planner”
of colluding agents requires the agent to issue a note even if the agent does not
like the good. It may also be optimal to issue a note with probability xc < X
in order to make notes more scarce, increase the transaction value of a note, and
receive more goods in exchange for a note. In this case, the “social planner” forbids
the issue of a note in some cases when the agent likes the good. So the rule for
note-issuing can be summarized as follows:
– (for the case xc · X): “never issue a note if a good lies distance z > X from
you, and if z · X, issue a note with probability xc=X;”
– (for the case xc > X): “always issue a note if z · X, and if z > X, issue a
note with probability (xc ¡ X)=(1 ¡ X).”
Private agents have no means to collude, so if such an agent issues a note, no
other agent of this type is under obligation to redeem the note. Hence each such6 S. Boyarchenko and S. Levendorskiˇ i
note will be redeemed with zero probability, and in no symmetric equilibrium is it
optimal for anyone to accept a note issued by a private agent. Thus we may assume
that notes of private agents do not circulate at all, and hereafter, we call notes of
colluding agents simply notes. The agents also diﬀer in their production: private
agents are endowed with better production opportunities, so that they suﬀer lower
disutility (cost) of production per unit of good. Namely, we set the marginal cost
of production equal to 1 for a private agent, and k ¸ 1 for a colluding agent.
We assume that any private agent can carry either one unit of money or a note,
or neither of these. Therefore each private agent can be in one of three states: a




s the value functions of the agent in these states. A colluding agent can
carry one or zero units of money. Notice that colluding agents never carry notes,
but they can issue them (in other words, notes do not specify a state of a colluding
agent). Thus a colluding agent can be in one of two states: a buyer with a unit of
money or a trader without money. The corresponding value functions are denoted
by V c
m and V c. Agents meet pair-wise and at random, and in each meeting decide
whether to trade, and how much to produce for a note or a unit of money. When
two agents meet they cannot trade unless one agent is a seller and the other is
either a buyer with a mean of exchange or a colluding agent entitled to issue a
note. Also a trade can take place if both agents are colluding ones and there is a
single coincidence of wants.4
Evidently, the seller does not produce if she is worse oﬀ after the trade. We
assume that the buyer (except for the case when two colluding agents meet, or when
a colluding agent redeems a note) makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the seller,
which enables her to extract all the seller’s surplus from trade. This means that if
a trade takes place, the seller produces her reservation quantity, i.e. the quantity
that makes her indiﬀerent between producing and not producing. Therefore a
private seller produces amount qnp (for a note) or qmp (for a unit of money) given
by
V p
n ¡ V p
s = qnp; and V p
m ¡ V p
s = qmp: (2.1)
A colluding agent produces for a private buyer the assigned quantity qn to redeem
a note and qmc for a unit of money, where qmc solves
V c
m ¡ V c = kqmc: (2.2)
A private buyer decides whether to spend her means of exchange given the
amount of good the seller agrees to produce. We assume that the buyer trades if
she is not worse oﬀ after the trade, therefore she spends her unit of money with
probability xmp when she meets a private producer, where
xmp =
½
X iﬀ u(qmp) ¸ V p
m ¡ V p
s
0 otherwise: (2.3)
The case when the buyer meets a colluding producer is treated in the same way:
we denote by xm the probability of spending money and replace xmp and qmp
in (2.3) by xm and qmc respectively. Similarly, the note holder spends her note
4 When the buyer is a colluding agent and has to issue a note even if she does not like
the good, we also use the label single coincidence meeting.Inside and Outside money 7




X iﬀ u(qj) ¸ V p
n ¡ V p
s
0 otherwise: j 2 fnp;ng (2.4)
Notice that (2.1), (2.3) and (2.4) together imply that
xmp =
½





X iﬀ u(qj) ¸ qnp
0 otherwise j 2 fnp;ng: (2.6)
Also, we can derive
xm =
½
X iﬀ u(qmc) ¸ qmp
0 otherwise: (2.7)
Now suppose that a colluding agent meets a private seller. If the former has
no money, she issues a note with probability xc, following the rule assigned by the
“social planner.” The trading strategy of a colluding agent with money is more
complicated because the decision to trade requires choosing the means of exchange.
This choice depends on the note-issuing rule xc. Let z be the distance between the
buyer and the seller’s good. If z · xc · X, then the buyer spends her money with
probability xmc given by
xmc =
½
xc iﬀ u(qmp) ¡ (V c
m ¡ V c) ¸ u(qnp)
0 otherwise:
The last equation says that if the agent spends her money, she is not worse oﬀ
than when she pays with a note, and from (2.2), this is equivalent to
xmc =
½
xc iﬀ u(qmp) ¡ kqmc ¸ u(qnp)
0 otherwise: (2.8)




X ¡ xc iﬀ u(qmp) ¡ (V c
m ¡ V c) ¸ 0
0 otherwise:




X ¡ xc iﬀ u(qmp) ¡ kqmc ¸ 0
0 otherwise: (2.9)
Notice that the case where the socially optimal (for colluding agents) probability of
note-issuing xc > X can be treated similarly. However we are going to concentrate
here on the case xc · X, so we omit the alternative case from our consideration
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Finally, when two colluding agents meet, the seller produces qc, the agreed
amount of good, for the buyer. The “social planner” would like to assign qc = q¤,
where q¤ maximizes the trading surplus, u(q) ¡ kq:
u0(q¤) = k; (2.10)
However the socially optimal level of production may contradict incentives of
agents.5 Therefore qc · q¤, and is the largest among those for which the incentive
compatibility constraints below are satisﬁed.
Private agents face no additional incentive compatibility constraints, since they
make only individual decisions and do not collude. Colluding agents face three such
constraints when they carry a unit of money, and three similar constraints when
they have no money. These constraints ensure that an agent ﬁnds it optimal to
obey the rules imposed by the “social planner”. If these constraints are violated,
then agents will defect, and the collusion will become impossible.
Denote by Vs (Vm) the value of a colluding agent without (with) a unit of
money who is deprived of the privilege of issuing universally accepted notes. The
ﬁrst pair of incentive compatibility constraints expresses the fact that the payoﬀ
to a colluding agent, when she redeems a note, is at least as large as the gain from
failing to do so:
V c ¸ kqn + Vs: (2.11)
V c
m ¸ kqn + Vm: (2.12)
Second, we need a pair of non-defection conditions for the inside exchange among
colluding agents. These conditions state that there should be no gain from the
failure to produce qc whenever required: V c ¸ kqc + Vs and V c
m ¸ kqc + Vm.
Hence,
kqc = minfkq¤;V 1 ¡ Vs; V c
m ¡ Vmg; (2.13)
where q¤ solves (2.10).
The last group of constraints consists of conditions of non-defection from the
assigned probability of note-issuing xc. If xc = X, an individually optimal prob-
ability, there is no incentive to deviate. If xc < X, and a colluding agent issues
a note in violation of this condition, she derives additional instantaneous utility
u(qnp) but her continuation value becomes Vs (if she has no money) or Vm (if she
carries a unit of money). Hence, if xc < X, then
V c ¸ u(qnp) + Vs; V c
m ¸ u(qnp) + Vm: (2.14)
Note that
0 · Vs · V p
s ; (2.15)
because the marginal production cost for private agents is 1, and for colluding
agents, it is k ¸ 1; Vs ¸ 0, since the autarky gives 0 for a defector. When a
defector with a unit of money trades, she extracts the same surplus as a private
5 Notice, that in the random matching framework, it is not optimal to produce for
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agent with a unit of money. After this trade the defector has a continuation value
Vm, and a private agent with money V p
m. Therefore,
Vm · V p
m: (2.16)
We consider below only stationary equilibria, therefore the distribution of money
among the types of agents and the ﬂows of money and notes between the types
must be independent of time. This requirement leads to the following steady state
conditions. Denote by sp and sc the fractions of private and colluding agents
respectively, and by N the proportion of private agents carrying notes. Let spMp
and scMc denote the fractions of the aggregate money supply, M, which belong
to private and colluding agents, respectively. Clearly, sp + sc = 1 and
spMp + scMc = M: (2.17)
The remaining two steady state conditions require that the ﬂow of notes being
issued equal the ﬂow of notes being destroyed, and that the ﬂow of money from
colluding to private agents is equal to the ﬂow in the opposite direction. The ﬂow
of notes being issued is equal to
sp(1 ¡ N ¡ Mp)scf(1 ¡ Mc)xc + Mc(xc ¡ xmc)g;
the ﬂow of notes being destroyed is equal to spNscxn. The inﬂow of money into
the colluding fraction of population is equal to spMpxmsc(1 ¡ Mc) the outﬂow of
money from colluding agents is equal to
sp(1 ¡ Mp ¡ N)scMc(xmc + x+
mc):
Therefore the steady state conditions are
(1 ¡ N ¡ Mp)(xc ¡ Mcxmc) = Nxn; (2.18)
Mpxm(1 ¡ Mc) = (1 ¡ Mp ¡ N)Mc(xmc + x+
mc): (2.19)
Let r be the rate of time preference and ½ = r=® be a normalized discount
rate. Consider a private seller. Her value function satisﬁes the following Bellman’s
equation:
½V p
s = spNxnp[V p
n ¡ V p
s ¡ qnp] + spMpxmp[V p




m ¡ V p
s ¡ qmp] + sc(xc ¡ Mcxmc)[V p
n ¡ V p
s ¡ qnp]:
In words, the expected discounted ﬂow of value of the seller equals the sum of all
expected net gains from trade. Namely, with probability spNxnp the seller meets
a buyer of her type with a note who likes the seller’s good, or with probability
sc(xc¡Mcxmc) the seller meets a colluding agent who either has no money or just
prefers to pay with a note. As a result of both of such meetings, the seller becomes a
note-holder. Similarly, with probability spMpxmp (respectively, scMc(xmc +x+
mc))
the seller can trade her good for money to a private (respectively, colluding) buyer
and become a money holder. By similar reasoning, we can obtain the rest of the10 S. Boyarchenko and S. Levendorskiˇ i
Bellman’s equations. Using (2.1) and (2.2), we can replace value functions with q’s
and write simpliﬁed Bellman’s equations:
V p
s = 0; V p
n = qnp; V p
m = qmp; (2.20)
½qnp = sp(1 ¡ Mp ¡ N)xnp[u(qnp) ¡ qnp] + scxn[u(qn) ¡ qnp]; (2.21)
½qmp = sp(1 ¡ Mp ¡ N)xmp[u(qmp) ¡ qmp]+
sc(1 ¡ Mc)xm[u(qmc) ¡ qmp]; (2.22)
½V c = sp(1 ¡ Mp ¡ N)minfxc;Xgu(qnp)¡
spNxnkqn + scX(u(qc) ¡ kqc); (2.23)
½kqmc = sp(1 ¡ Mp ¡ N)f¡xmcu(qnp)+
(xmc + x+
mc)[u(qmp) ¡ kqmc]g; (2.24)
Using (2.20), we can derive from (2.15) and (2.16) that Vs = 0 and Vm = V p
m =
qmp, and rewrite non-defection conditions (2.11)–(2.14) as follows:
V c ¸ kqn; (2.25)
V c ¸ kqn + qmp ¡ kqmc; (2.26)
kqc = minfkq¤;V c;V c + kqmc ¡ qmpg; (2.27)
V c ¸ u(qnp); V c ¸ u(qnp) + qmp ¡ kqmc; (2.28)
There is one more step left before we can deﬁne the equilibrium. As we have
mentioned it earlier, the objective of the “social planner” of colluding agents was
to maximize their welfare. The welfare consists of the welfare of agents with and
without money:
W = McV c
m + (1 ¡ Mc)V c = V c + Mc(V c
m ¡ V c):
Using (2.2), we obtain W = V c + Mckqmc .
Let g = fqnp;qc;qn;qmp;qmc;V c;xnp;xc;xn;xmp;xm;xmc;x+
mc;Mp;Mc;Ng. We
call g a stationary equilibrium if
(i) the Bellman’s equations (2.20)–(2.24) are satisﬁed;
(ii) probabilities xnp;xn;xmp;xm;xmc;x+
mc satisfy optimality conditions (2.5), (2.6),
(2.8) and (2.9);
(iii) colluding agents choose xc, qc and qn in order to maximize their welfare;
(iv) incentive compatibility constraints (2.25)–(2.28) are satisﬁed;
(v) steady state conditions (2.17)–(2.19) hold.
We are going to classify equilibria according to the types of exchange between
agents:
– monetary exchange between private agents;
– monetary exchange between private and colluding agents;
– note exchange between private agents;
– note exchange between both types of agents.Inside and Outside money 11
The list of possible combinations of patterns of exchange and note-issuing rules
is huge. We can make it much shorter if we rule out the case in which there are
no trades between types and the economy consists of two separate economies each
comprising agents of one type. Since our objective is to explain the use of inside
money in the Russian economy, we also want to rule out the case without note
exchange between the two types. Such a pattern of exchange is possible if either
there remain no notes in circulation at all and the economy is a pure monetary
one or some notes remain in circulation among private agents and play the role of
additional ﬁat money for these agents.
In terms of parameters of the model, these restrictions imply: 6
N + MP < 1; N > 0; (2.29)
xc + xmc + x+
mc > 0; (2.30)
xn + xm > 0: (2.31)
Since we assume that there is note exchange between the two types, we must have
xc > 0 or xn > 0. The steady state condition (2.18) implies that
xc > 0 () xn > 0; (2.32)
therefore we may impose either of the conditions in (2.32), and then (2.30)–(2.31)
are satisﬁed. Finally, we assume that notes and money are not given away as gifts
so that
qnp + qn > 0; qmp + qmc > 0: (2.33)
Now, we divide equilibria satisfying additional conditions (2.29)–(2.33) into two
groups:
– type-1 equilibria: money is used by private agents only, notes are exchanged
both between private agents and between private and colluding agents;
– type-2 equilibria: notes and money are used in trades between private agents
and between private and colluding agents.
Thus, 1 and 2 indicate the number of diﬀerent types of exchange between private
and colluding agents in equilibrium. In Sections 2 and 3, we study type-1 and
type-2 equilibria, respectively.
6 If (2.29) fails, all private agents have either notes or money and do not trade at all,
or there are no notes in circulation; if (2.30) fails, all colluding agents pay with neither
notes (if xc = 0) nor money (xmc = x
+
mc = 0), and hence, there is no exchange between
the types; if (2.31) fails, all private agents pay to colluding agents with neither notes
(xn = 0) nor money (xm = 0), and hence, there is no exchange between the types.12 S. Boyarchenko and S. Levendorskiˇ i
3 Type-1 equilibria: no monetary trades between the types
3.1 Equilibria speciﬁcation
Suppose an equilibrium without monetary trades between the two types exists.
Then steady state conditions (2.17) and (2.19) become redundant. Further, in










Since we assume that there is trade between types, with notes as the means of
exchange, it must be that xc > 0, and (2.32) gives xn > 0, hence xn = X, and
from (2.6), we obtain
u(qn) ¸ qnp: (3.35)
Using (2.33), (3.35), (2.6) and (2.21), we obtain
qn > 0; qnp > 0: (3.36)
Even though several equilibrium price patterns may result in the absence of
monetary trades between private and colluding agents, it is possible to show that
only the case examined below is feasible in this model. Namely, equilibrium prices
are such that it is not optimal for private agents to spend money when trading with
colluding agents but colluding agents are willing to spend money in some cases.
In a steady state, this pattern of exchange leads to all the money accumulated
by the private agents: Mc = 0, Mpsp = M. Since we rule out autarky for the
private agents, this case can be taken into consideration only if M < sp and
hence, Mp = M=sp < 1. In the rest of this Section, we ﬁx Mp 2 (0;1). Further, by
(2.7)–(2.9) we must have that
xm = 0; u(qmc) < qmp; (3.37)
and
xmc + x+
mc > 0; u(qmp) ¸ qmc: (3.38)
Notice that we must assume that
qmc < qmp; (3.39)
if qmc ¸ qmp, there is no reason why private money holders should not accept qmc
units of good from colluding agents if they accept qmp · qmc from private sellers.
Let h ´ ½=X, we will call this parameter trading friction. Set B(°) ´ sp(1 ¡
Mp)=(1+°), ·m ´ (xmc +x+
mc)=X, °m1 ´ xmc=X. Using (2.6) and (3.34), we can








(u(qmp) ¡ qmp); (3.41)
hV c = B(°)[minf1;°gu(qnp) ¡ °kqn] + sc(u(qc) ¡ kqc); (3.42)
hkqmc = B(°)f·m(u(qmp) ¡ kqmc) ¡ °m1u(qnp)g: (3.43)
Since Mc = 0, i.e. there are no money holders among colluding agents, the “social
planner” maximizes V c. It is possible to show that incentive compatibility con-
straints (2.25)–(2.28) become redundant in this setting. However, if the colluding
agents ever issue notes, the following participation constraint must be satisﬁed:
minf1;°gu(qnp) ¡ °kqn ¸ 0: (3.44)
Thus in this Section, we are looking for a solution to (3.40)–(3.43), satisfying
(3.34)–(3.39) and (3.44). In Boyarchenko and Levendorskiˇ i [4], we prove that there
are two equilibrium scenarios: either
° = 1; xmc = X; qmc = 0; u(qn) = qnp = qmp; (3.45)






q = u(q); (3.46)
or
° 2 (0;1); xmc = 0; ·m = 1 ¡ °: (3.47)
In the ﬁrst case, colluding agents issue notes with the individually optimal
frequency, and they would have preferred spending a unit of money to paying with
a note. Money has no value for these agents, which is indicated by qmc = 0. In
the second case, the “social planner” restricts note issuing, and colluding agents
would have paid with money only when note printing was not allowed. In what
follows, we are going to study the case of small trading frictions, because it admits
analytical solutions. In particular, in Subsection 3.3, we show that if the h is small,
then alternative (3.47) is non-optimal, and hence, equilibrium is either determined
by (3.45)–(3.46), or it does not exist at all.
3.2 Low productivity colluding agents
If the number of single coincidence meetings per unit of time is large the trading
friction, h, is small. This means that agents can be patient and wait for a better
trading opportunity to arrive. A private buyer with a note will not be willing to
trade with colluding sellers, unless colluding agents can redeem a note for a suﬃ-
ciently high amount qn. Because they suﬀer higher production cost than private
agents, this qn may be too high a production level for colluding agents. Therefore
it may be optimal for colluding agents not to trade at all. In this case, it remains
for private agents to trade only among themselves. The economy splits into two
disjoint sectors, a case which we do not consider in this paper.
Theorem 3.1 For k > 1 ﬁxed, there exists h0 > 0 such that if h 2 (0;h0) then
type-1 equilibria do not exist.14 S. Boyarchenko and S. Levendorskiˇ i
3.3 High productivity colluding agents
If k = 1, i.e. colluding agents are as productive as private agents, a problem
described in the previous Subsection does not arise and an equilibrium with inter-
acting types exists for arbitrary small h > 0.
Theorem 3.2 Let k = 1. Then there exists h0 > 0 such that for h 2 (0;h0)
a) a type-1 equilibrium exists, and it is unique;
b) the equilibrium amount of good produced by private sellers qnp = qmp, can be




[u(q) ¡ q]; (3.48)
c) colluding agents issue notes with probability xc = X, the equilibrium amount of
notes in circulation equals sp(1 ¡ MP)=2, and qn, the optimal amount of good
redeemed for a note, is determined from
u(qn) = qnp; (3.49)
Let q¤ denote the unique positive solution to
u(q) = q; (3.50)
then it is possible to show that
q¤ < qn < qnp = qmp < q¤; (3.51)
Moreover as h ! +0, qn and qnp = qmp converge to q¤. Thus we see that
– colluding agents exercise their monopoly power and redeem for a note less than
what private agents produce for the same note or for a unit of money;
– as the trading friction vanishes (h ! 0), so does the monopoly power as mea-
sured by 1 ¡ qnp=qn.
The next theorem shows that equilibrium exits even when the trading friction is
small and colluding agents are less productive than private agents. For this to
be true, k ¡ 1 must be small. The theorem also gives necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for an admissible level of k ¡ 1.
Theorem 3.3 Let qnp be a unique positive solution to (3.48). Then
a) if
k < u(qnp)=u¡1(qnp); (3.52)
then there exists h0 > 0 such that for h 2 (0;h0], a type-1 equilibrium exists, and
it is unique. The equilibrium amount of goods produced in a round of trade and
that of notes in circulation are determined as in Theorem 3.2.
b) if
k > u(qnp)=u¡1(qnp);
then there exists h0 > 0 such that for h 2 (0;h0], a type-1 equilibrium does not
exist.Inside and Outside money 15
If k > 1 but satisﬁes (3.52), then claims made after Theorem 3.2 remain valid.
Moreover, the equilibrium quantities qnp and qn, and the welfare of private agents
V = sp(1+Mp)qnp=2 are independent of the diﬀerence k¡1. However, the cost kqn,
which a colluding agent suﬀers while redeeming a note, increases, and the value
function of colluding agents, V c, decreases with k growing. The loss of welfare is
proportional to k ¡ 1:










where k1 = (k ¡ 1)=h.7
To summarize, when the trading friction and the diﬀerence in the marginal
productivity of agents are small, only colluding agents have to bear the cost of
their low productivity, their monopoly power notwithstanding. At the same time,
prices observable by private agents are independent of k¡1. Even though Theorem
3.3 provides an insight into the existence of type-1 equilibria, we are going to
formulate one more existence theorem below. This will allow us to compare type-1
and type-2 equilibria in the next Section. By Theorem 3.3, qnp ! q¤ as h ! +0,
therefore from (3.52), we deduce the following result.
Theorem 3.4 a) Let




Then there exists h0 > 0 such that if h 2 (0;h0] and k · 1 + k1h, then a type-1
equilibrium exists.
b) Let




Then there exists h0 > 0 such that if h 2 (0;h0] and k ¸ 1 + k1h, then a type-1
equilibrium does not exist.
It is important to notice that when the product k1(1 ¡ Mp) crosses a certain
threshold, namely, the RHS in (3.54) and (3.55), a type-1 equilibrium vanishes.
3.4 Dependence on the supply of money
Suppose that the government gives an additional amount of money to some private
sellers. Then some of private sellers become buyers, fractions sp and sc of private
and colluding agents do not change, but the fraction M of agents carrying money
and the fraction Mp = M=sp of private agents carrying money increase. After some
transition period, the economy arrives to the new steady state. If the increase in
the money supply is not very large, the type of equilibrium remains the same, and
in the new steady state
7 O(h) is the standard notation for any function f(h), which decays as fast as h, as
h ! 0: jf(h)j · Ch, where C is independent of h.16 S. Boyarchenko and S. Levendorskiˇ i
1) the amount of notes sp(1¡Mp)=2 in circulation decreases but the total amount
of liquidity spMp + sp(1 ¡ Mp)=2 = sp(1 + Mp)=2 increases: 2 units of money
are needed to replace 1 note;
2) the product k1(1 ¡ Mp) decreases, hence the economy moves away from the
threshold where it can lose stability and split into two disjoint economies;





increases, provided M is not large.
Moreover, we can state the following important welfare result.
Theorem 3.5 If the trading friction is small, and colluding agents do not diﬀer
in productivity from private agents, then their welfare decreases with M growing.
This result implies that when colluding agents have the same marginal produc-
tivity as private agents, the former would prefer the supply of outside money being
reduced to the level, which is necessary to sustain the equilibrium. The above re-
mains true if k ¡1 is positive but small. In general, for a given k > 1, there exists
a minimal positive level M¤ = M¤(k) such that if M < M¤(k), the economy splits
into two separate economies (M¤ can be found from (3.54)), and an optimal level
M¤¤(k) ¸ M¤(k), which maximizes the welfare of colluding agents and can be
obtained from (3.53). It is possible to show that the supply of money maximizing
the welfare of colluding agents is smaller than the supply of money optimal for
private agents.
4 Type-2 equilibria: all types of trade
4.1 Main results
Due to more complex pattern of exchange, it is more diﬃcult to obtain analytical
results, and constructions become long. So, we start with the description of the
main results.8 In the preceding Section, we have reduced the initial problem to a
relatively simple equation (which, for example, in the case of the Cobb-Douglas
utility function, admits an explicit solution so that it is possible to obtain analytic
expressions for all endogenous variables); here we manage to reduce the initial
problem to a constrained maximization of a rather complicated function on an
interval (0;1). From the computational point of view, to solve such a problem and
calculate equilibrium values of endogenous variables is easy. The corresponding
procedures are robust and do not require much computation time. A closed form
solution is however impossible even for the simplest utility functions.9
We study the case of moderately picky agents, small trading frictions and
moderate money supply. The main results can be summarized as follows:
8 For a full version, including numerical examples and their discussion, see Boyarchenko
and Levendorskiˇ i [4].
9 In numerical examples, we consider the Cobb-Douglas utility u(q) = dq
¯, where d > 0
and ¯ 2 (0;1).Inside and Outside money 17
1. Colluding agents issue notes below the individually optimal level.10
2. A colluding money holder pays with a note whenever she is allowed and as a
result, colluding agents accumulate more money per capita than private ones.11
3. If the trading friction vanishes faster than the diﬀerence k ¡ 1, the economy
loses stability and splits.
4. Type-2 equilibria are more fragile than type-1 equilibria in the sense that the
threshold (mentioned after Theorem 3.4) for the former is lower than that for
the latter.
4.2 Speciﬁcation of type-2 equilibria
In this Subsection, we sketch the reduction of the initial problem to a constrained
optimization problem. This reduction involves tedious algebra: for the details see
Boyarchenko and Levendorskiˇ i [4].
To simplify the study of type-2 equilibria, we make two assumptions:
h=X · ²; (4.56)
where ² > 0 is suﬃciently small, i.e. agents are not very picky, and
M < sc; (4.57)
which means that the fraction of colluding agents with money is bounded away
from one. Now (4.57) and (2.17) imply that
Mc · M=sc < 1: (4.58)
These two conditions exclude “bad” equilibria with xc » 1, when too many notes
are being issued and equilibrium quantities are small (one can construct such
equilibria if h=X >> 1).
It is possible to show that private agents always use money and notes in trades
with each other. This implies in particular, that xn = xm = X and
u(qmc) ¸ qmp: (4.59)
Also we can prove that colluding agents issue notes whenever they are allowed
to do this. These results make it possible to simplify the steady state conditions
(2.18)–(2.19). Fix ° 2 (0;1) then using xc=X = ° and (xmc + x+
mc)=X = 1 ¡ ° we
obtain:
(1 ¡ N ¡ Mc)° = N;
Mp(1 ¡ Mc) = (1 ¡ Mp ¡ N)Mc(1 ¡ °):
10 If agents are too specialized in consumption, there may exist “bad” equilibria when
too many notes circulate and the production level is too low.
11 It is shown in Boyarchenko [3], that in a pure monetary equilibrium, agents with
higher productivity accumulate more money per capita. The eﬀect of concentration of
all the money in a group of high productivity agents was also demonstrated in Wallace
and Zhou [15].18 S. Boyarchenko and S. Levendorskiˇ i
Using (2.17) and the last two equations, we ﬁnd





where Mp = Mp(°) is a positive solution to the equation
2°spM2
p + Mp(1 + °(sc ¡ sp ¡ 2M)) + M(° ¡ 1) = 0: (4.62)
It is easy to verify that for any ° 2 (0;1), there exists a unique positive root of
equation (4.62), such that Mp 2 (0;M). Moreover Mp = Mp(°) is continuous on
[0;1). Now from (2.17) and (4.60) it follows that Mc > M, i.e. colluding agents
accumulate more money per capita than private ones. For ° 2 [0;1), set B(°) =
sp(1¡Mp(°))=(1+°), and notice that since Mp · M < 1, B(°) is bounded away
from 0 uniformly in h. Keeping in mind that Mp and Mc are uniquely deﬁned by
a choice of °, and using (4.61), we rewrite the Bellman’s equations (2.21)–(2.23)
as follows
hqnp = B(°)(u(qnp) ¡ qnp) + sc(u(qn) ¡ qnp); (4.63)
hqmp = B(°)(u(qmp) ¡ qmp) + sc(1 ¡ Mc(°))(u(qmc) ¡ qmp); (4.64)
hV c = B(°)°(u(qnp) ¡ kqn) + sc(u(qc) ¡ kqc); (4.65)
hkqmc = B(°)(1 ¡ °)(u(qmp) ¡ kqmc): (4.66)
Next, it is possible to show that there exists h0 > 0 such that for any h 2 (0;h0],
in equilibrium, colluding agents produce for each other the “socially optimal”
amount of good qc = q¤; incentive compatibility constraints (2.25)–(2.28) are sat-
isﬁed; and
u(qn) = qnp: (4.67)
Now, for a given ° 2 [0;1), we can deﬁne step by step:
– Mp = Mp(°) from (4.62);
– Mc = Mc(°) from (4.60);
– N = N(°) from (4.61);
– qnp = qnp(°) from
hqnp = B(°)(u(qnp) ¡ qnp) (4.68)
– qn(°) = u¡1(qnp(°));








By substituting (4.69) into (4.64), we obtain an equation
hqmp = B(°)(u(qmp) ¡ qmp)+
sc(1 ¡ MC(°))(u(qmc(°;qmp)) ¡ qmp): (4.70)Inside and Outside money 19
For ° ﬁxed, (4.70) can be written in the form
Aq = v(q);
where A is a positive constant, and v satisﬁes the same conditions as u, namely,
v is increasing, concave and satisﬁes the Inada conditions (the veriﬁcation of all
these properties is straightforward). Hence, (4.70) has a (unique) positive solution
qmp = qmp(°), and after that, (4.69) deﬁnes qmc as a function of °.
Thus we obtain all endogenous variables as functions of °. Recall that colluding
agents choose ° to maximize their welfare W = V c + Mckqmc. We see that the
colluding agents maximize a function
©(°) = h¡1B(°)°(u(qnp) ¡ kqn) + Mc(°)kqmc(°)
on (0;1). Notice that © is the welfare of colluding agents net of the gain from trade
with each other. We are able to prove that optimality conditions and incentive
compatibility constraints are satisﬁed by construction, and the only remaining
constraint is (4.59).
In Boyarchenko and Levendorskiˇ i [4], we provide necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions for existence of type-2 equilibria. In particular, we show that there exist
C > 0 and h0 > 0 such that if h 2 (0;h0], X ¸ Ch, and k ¸ 1 + Ch, then type-2
equilibria do not exist and hence no non-degenerate equilibria exist.12 Thus, if the
trading friction vanishes faster than the diﬀerence k ¡ 1, then the economy loses
stability and splits into two disjoint parts.
4.3 Some asymptotic analysis
Here we derive asymptotic formulas for equilibrium quantities as h ! 0, which
allow us to ﬁnd approximate conditions of existence of equilibria, approximate
formulas for value functions, and compare type-2 and type-1 equilibria. By the
result stated at the end of the previous Subsection, an equilibrium does not exist
if the diﬀerence k ¡ 1 is suﬃciently large. Therefore to obtain existence result,
we may assume that k = 1 + k1h, where k1 = O(1) as h ! 0. For simplicity, we
assume that k1 is a non-negative constant, and in the end, formulate existence
conditions in terms of k1.
First, we obtain the asymptotics for the objective function of colluding agents.
As h ! +0,







¡ k1°B(°) + Mc(°)
¶
: (4.72)
By using the above approximation, we can simplify the study of type-2 equi-








12 In Section 3, we have shown that under these conditions, type-1 equilibria do not
exist as well.20 S. Boyarchenko and S. Levendorskiˇ i
We can state the following analogue of Theorem 3.4, which holds provided F(°)
is increasing on [0;1).
Theorem 4.1 a) Let




then there exists h0 > 0 such that f h 2 (0;h0] and k · 1 + k1h, then a type-2
equilibrium exist.
b) Let




Then there exists h0 > 0 such that if h 2 (0;h0] and k ¸ 1 + k1h, then a type-2
equilibrium does not exist.
Notice that the expression on the LHS in (4.73) and (4.74) is similar to the one
in (3.54)–(3.55). We see that the RHS in (4.73) and (4.74) is smaller than the one
in (3.54)–(3.55), i.e. 2(1 + u0(q¤))=(u0(q¤)sp). By Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 4.1,
both type-1 and type-2 disappear when the product k1(1 ¡ M) crosses a certain
critical value. This critical value is lower for type-2 equilibria, this means that
type-2 equilibria are more fragile than type-1 equilibria.
We can use approximation (4.71)–(4.72) to compare the welfare of colluding
agents in both types of equilibria.
Theorem 4.2 There exists h0 > 0 such that if h 2 (0;h0] and a type-2 equilibrium
exists, then a type-1 equilibrium exists as well, and the welfare of colluding agents
in the latter equilibrium is larger than in the former.
The reason a type-2 equilibrium is inferior is constraint (4.59), which must be sat-
isﬁed if type-1 is ever to get money from private agents. To satisfy this constraint,
colluding agents have to produce suﬃciently large amount of good for a unit of
money. It is possible to show that to achieve the same level of welfare as in a
type-1 equilibrium, colluding agents must issue notes in large quantities. If this
is the case, then the relative value of holding money increases and private agents
start to require even more of a good in exchange for a unit of money.
5 Conclusion
We have constructed a benchmark model reﬂecting basic features of the Russian
virtual economy, which generates equilibria with wide-spread use of money sub-
stitutes. There are two types of agents in the economy: a type of low productivity
agents who can collude and issue universally accepted notes (inside money), and
a type of high productivity agents who have no means to collude and act as indi-
vidually optimizing agents. There is genuine (outside) money in the economy as
well. Within each type, agents specialize in consumption. With this structure, we
have shown that the existence and essential properties of equilibria depend on the
trading frictions, the diﬀerence in marginal productivity of agents, and the supply
of money in the economy. In general, the equilibria can be classiﬁed according toInside and Outside money 21
two criteria: types of exchange between agents and the probability of note issuing
assigned by the “social planner” of colluding agents. The list of possible combi-
nations of these two types of characterization is huge. We have classiﬁed possible
equilibria when the trading friction is small, and agents do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
in productivity.
If colluding and private agents trade with each other there may exist one or
both of the following equilibria:
1) an equilibrium without money ﬂows between the types because colluding agents
ﬁnd it optimal to produce only zero quantities of good for money (type-1
equilibrium), and
2) an equilibrium where both money and notes are used in trades between the
types (type-2 equilibrium).
In the former equilibrium, colluding agents issue money substitutes with the in-
dividually optimal probability. In the latter equilibrium, the “social planner” re-
stricts note issuing below the individually optimal level, making notes more scarce
and increasing the transaction value of a note. As a result, colluding agents pay
with money only when they are not allowed to pay with a note for a good they
like.
We have shown that if the trading friction is suﬃciently small and there is
no diﬀerence in productivity of agents, then type-2 equilibria are inferior from
the point of view of colluding agents agents. Therefore colluding agents would
not use money unless forced by some exogenous (from the point of view of the
model) factor, like the necessity to pay taxes with money (to treat this situation
consistently, our model should be modiﬁed). This agrees with previous ﬁndings
by N. Wallace and others about superiority of inside money to outside money. If
the trading friction is not very small, and colluding agents are fairly productive,
then type-2 equilibria are superior for them, but the supply of money maximizing
welfare of colluding agents is smaller than that for private agents. If the existing
money supply is at or above the optimal level (from the point of view of colluding
agents), there is a strong incentive for these agents to get rid of new money, should
the new money arrive.13
13 This result was obtained when one of the popular explanations for the widespread use
of money substitutes in the Russian economy was the insuﬃcient money supply. After
the money supply in the economy had increased signiﬁcantly due to high prices of oil ,
Mr. Greﬀ - the minister of economic development - still complained (in June 2000) that
the economy was unable to make a proper use of the money. We believe that this was a
good veriﬁcation of the model.22 S. Boyarchenko and S. Levendorskiˇ i
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